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The Contexts of Conversion among U.S.
Latinos
Aida I. Ramos*
George Fox University
Robert D. Woodberry
Baylor University
Christopher G. Ellison
The University of Texas at San Antonio
The growth of Protestantism among U.S. Latinos has been the focus of considerable discussion among
researchers. Yet few studies investigate how Latino Protestants and Latino Catholics differ, or which
types of Latinos convert from Catholicism to Protestantism. Our study tests various theories about why
some Latinos convert including a modified version of the semi-involuntary thesis, the national origin
hypothesis, and assimilation theory. We use data from a large national sample of U.S. Latinos and find
some support for assimilation theory and less for the semi-involuntary thesis. However, context matters.
If we divide Latinos into national origin groups, these groups strongly predict who converts and who are
lifelong Protestants. We discuss how war may influence the religious composition of early migrants and
thus shape both the religious composition and conversion of later migrants.
Key words: conversion; switching; Latino/as; Protestantism.
Numerous studies examine reasons for religious switching among non-Latinos in
the U.S. (e.g., Sherkat and Wilson 1995), but few examine switching among Latinos
(Hunt 1999; Perl et al. 2006; Skirbekk et al. 2010). Latin America was once almost
entirely Catholic, but that is rapidly changing (Steigenga and Cleary 2007).
Protestantism is also expanding quickly among Latinos in the United States (Diaz-
Stevens and Stevens-Arroyo 1998; Hunt 1999; Pew Research Center 2014a). In fact,
the share of U.S. Latinos who are Catholic dropped from 67% in 2010 to 55% in 2013
(Pew Research Center 2014a). What is still unknown is why this shift is occurring.
Research on the rise of Latino Protestantism is vital (Mulder et al. 2017). First,
Latinos have passed African Americans as the largest ethnic minority in the U.S.
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(U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Second, research on U.S. religious trends produce rosy
projections for the Catholic Church (Skirbekk et al. 2010), but these forecasts hinge
on continued growth in the Latino population. Significant conversions to
Protestantism—along with reductions in immigration—could alter these predictions.
Third, recent studies of Latino marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing suggest they
are converging towards non-Hispanic whites’ patterns (Landale and Oropesa 2007).
Because evangelicals differ from the broader U.S. population on issues of marriage
and childbearing (Ellison and Goodson 1997; Woodberry and Smith 1998); conver-
sion to evangelical Protestantism may mitigate some of this trend.
Fourth, Latino evangelicals have different political attitudes and voting pat-
terns than other Latinos (Ellison et al. 2011; Bartkowski et al. 2012). Latino evan-
gelicals are more likely than other Latinos to break with the traditional allegiance
to the Democratic Party and to support Republican candidates (Lee and Pachon
2007). Latino Protestants are especially prone to hold conservative positions on
social issues such as abortion rights and same-sex marriage (Ellison et al. 2005,
2011). Thus, significant Protestant growth could have important consequences for
the U.S. political future as it did in the presidential election of 2016, especially in
the context of continued Latino population growth.
We seek to understand which Latinos convert from Catholicism to
Protestantism. Scholars propose many theories to explain religious conversions,
but these theories have not been tested using nationally representative samples of
Latinos. Our study provides new insight about the growth of Latino Protestantism
in the U.S. by analyzing the factors that distinguish (1) converts to Protestantism
and (2) lifelong Protestants from (3) lifelong Catholics. We test theories of reli-
gious conversion such as assimilation theory: which posits that Latinos who are
trying to assimilate into American culture will be more likely to become
Protestant. We also test an extension of the semi-involuntary thesis which posits
that social sanctions help explain conversion among Latinos. Finally, based on our
knowledge of chain migration, the differential strength of Protestantism in differ-
ent Latin American countries, and the factors that spurred early (high risk) migra-
tion, we also propose a “national origins” thesis for Latino conversion. We test
these hypotheses using data from a large survey of U.S. Latinos commissioned by
the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Semi-Involuntary Thesis
One major theory of religious switching is rational choice theory (e.g.,
Iannaccone 1995, 1997; Finke and Stark 1988). Rational choice (RC) theory
assumes that people approach decisions by evaluating costs and benefits and then
acting to maximize benefits and minimize costs (Iannaccone 1995, 1997; Sherkat
1997). In relation to conversion, the theory posits that the decision to convert is
based on an individual’s evaluation of “religious rewards” (i.e., promise of heaven,
health, happiness) in relation to the costs (i.e., significant portion of individual’s
time must go to religious pursuits).
Other researchers find an individualistic version of RC theory insufficient.
They point out that community social norms and expectations also constrain indi-
vidual choice, especially if the individual believes the community is able and will-
ing to sanction them for violating community norms (Ellison 1995; Sherkat
1997). The extent to which communities monitor individual choices and apply
sanctions, varies depending on the nature of community social ties. When social
ties are consolidated, i.e., “. . . family, religion, employment, ethnicity, neighbor-
hood, and community are entangled” (Sherkat 1997: 75), decisions made in one
sphere of life impact others (Blau and Schwartz 1984). Moreover, being active in
the dominant religious community provides benefits such as a good reputation,
and exposure to marriage partners that non-participants miss out on, regardless of
whether anyone tries to sanction non-participants.
The “semi-involuntary institution” has been used to explain why there is
higher religious attendance of African Americans in the South compared to their
counterparts in the North (Ellison and Sherkat 1995). The theory states that due
to the strong influence of the Black Church in the South, Africans Americans go
to church more regularly to avoid community sanctions which could block their
access to important community resources. Similarly building on the “semi-invol-
untary institution” (SI) thesis, Philips (1998) argues that among Mormons, social
sanctions play a vital role in assuring compliance with church regulations and life-
style norms and in promoting congregational participation. Although the SI thesis
is primarily used to explain variation in religiosity and behavior, we extend it to
study conversion. When a particular community considers two religious traditions
distinct, people who switch traditions may be sanctioned. Moreover, converts miss
out on the benefits of belonging to the majority religious group in their commu-
nity, just like those who do not attend. Thus, religious conversions have social
costs that vary depending on the local community.
Semi-Involuntary Thesis among Latinos
Catholicism takes on a prominent role in Latino culture (Williams 1990)
where the “the spheres of family, culture, tradition, and language are often inter-
twined,” (Blau and Schwartz 1984; Mulder et al. 2017). The Catholic Church is
often the context of social participation in Latino cultural traditions such as quin-
cea~neras, las posadas, marriage, and so on (Williams 1990); thus conversion could
have significant social and emotional costs if converts are not invited or feel
excluded. Consequently, those with deeper embeddedness in Latino communities
with strong ties to Catholicism, will have fewer incentives to switch from
Catholicism to Protestantism, and may encounter greater costs for doing so.
Thus, the SI thesis is the focus of our first three hypotheses for Latino conver-
sion to Protestantism. First, dense social networks facilitate both the monitoring of
individual’s religious involvement and informal sanctioning (e.g., through expres-
sions of disapproval, loss of social esteem, and withdrawal of friendship and social
opportunities). One possible way to gauge these networks is via the concentration
of co-ethnics within one’s residential community (i.e., telephone exchange).
Areas of greater Latino concentration presumably have more consolidated social
ties (Blau and Schwartz 1984; Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990) making defections
from Catholicism to Protestantism more costly. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to respondents living in areas with low concentrations of Latinos,
respondents living in areas with higher concentrations of Latinos) will be less likely to be converts
to Protestantism as opposed to being lifelong Catholics.
We also measure these networks indirectly via region of residence. Region is
related to both co-ethnic concentrations and how established Latino communities
are (especially the Catholic Church within the Latino community). Latinos live
disproportionately in the West and West South Central regions compared to other
parts of the country. Most of these Latino communities have long histories in the
area (Telles and Ortiz 2008; Mulder et al. 2017), giving the Catholic Church deep
ties in these historic Latino communities, which may make it more costly for
Latinos to convert.
In the 1990s, Latinos moved rapidly to new areas in the southeastern U.S.
Across six Southeastern states the Latino population increased 308% between 1990
and 2000, compared with a 43% increase in traditional settlement areas (Vasquez
et al. 2008; Kochhar et al. 2005). The South remains the largest source of growth for
the Latino population between 2007 and 2014 (Pew Research Center 2016b). When
Latinos arrive in new areas, religious congregations can provide crucial support and
practical resources (Warner and Wittner 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000) provided
that Spanish language ministries are in place. In the South, evangelical Protestantism
is the dominant faith (Heyrman 1998; Pew Research Center 2016a) and is well posi-
tioned to convert migrants. Consequently, Latinos who move to these areas may be
attracted to Protestant churches as a source of assistance, while facing fewer sanctions
for conversion than co-ethnics living elsewhere. Keeping the above discussion in
mind, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Compared to respondents living in the Northeast, respondents who live in areas
with a long history of Latino residence and density such as the Western U.S and West South
Central U.S., will be less likely to convert to Protestantism as opposed to being likelong Catholics.
Hypothesis 3: Compared to those living in the Northeast, respondents who live in areas where the
dominant religion is Protestantism and where the Latino population is fairly recent, such as in the
North Central and East South Central/South Atlantic, will be more likely to be converts to
Protestantism as opposed to being lifelong Catholics.
National Origin Hypothesis among Latinos
We propose another hypothesis for religious switching: the “national origin
hypothesis.” The term “Latino” encompasses many national origin groups, each
with a different historical relationship with Catholicism and Protestantism. These
varying religious contexts may help explain U.S. Latinos’ conversions to
Protestantism. Latin American regions with large Protestant gains include Puerto
Rico and Central America (Pew Research Center 2014d). Over 40% of
Guatemalans now belong to Protestant churches and Protestantism continues to
grow rapidly (Pew Research Center 2014d). Rates of Protestant adherence are also
high in Puerto Rico (33%), El Salvador (36%), Honduras (41%), Nicaragua
(40%), and Costa Rica (25%) (Pew Research Center 2014d). Lower adherence is
seen in Panama (19%), Dominican Republic (23%), and Mexico (8%).
One explanation for the high levels of Protestantism in some of these counties
is the history of violent conflict between Marxist rebels and the government.
Violence prompted the Catholic Church to remove priests from rural areas, and in
their absence, lay-led Protestant movements flourished (Garrard-Burnett 1998;
Brusco 2010). Protestant missionaries also focused on Bible translation into indige-
nous languages, which gave many lay indigenous people their first direct access to
the Bible. Conversion rates have been much higher among these ethnic minorities
than the dominant Spanish speaking population (Barrett et al. 2001; Garrard-
Burnett 1998).
Moreover, the violent civil wars that wracked many Central American coun-
tries (i.e., Guatemala) in the 1970s–1990s often occurred in areas with large
minority communities. These conflicts made it risky for young men to stay in their
hometowns due to threats of being conscripted or killed; and thus spurred many to
immigrate to the United States. Later migrants from these regions could use the
homes, networks, and resources of early migrants—greatly reducing migration risks
and establishing migrant chains from the same regions. Thus, Central American
migration may have come disproportionately from regions where conversions to
Protestantism were already taking place and considered a realistic option.
Similarly, Puerto Ricans in the U.S. tend to be disproportionately more
Protestant than Catholic (29% Protestant, 45% Catholic) compared to all other
Latinos in the U.S. (22% Protestant, 55% Catholic) (Pew Research Center 2015).
These patterns may be explained by the fact that the U.S. took over Puerto Rico
at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, which allowed Protestant mis-
sionaries to work in Puerto Rico without the restrictions they faced in most Latin
American countries and undercut the dominance of the Catholic Church there
(Cruz 2005). Puerto Rican-led Protestant congregations were already established
in the period 1916–1928 (Cruz 2005; Mulder et al. 2017). Later in the 1920s,
Protestant congregations established by Puerto Ricans became important centers
of social support for Puerto Ricans living in New York due to lack of Spanish lan-
guage ministries in established Catholic churches (Thomas 2010; Mulder et al.
2017).
Conversely, Mexico had an anti-clerical government for much of the 20th
century, which violently suppressed Catholics (e.g., The Cristero Rebellion)
(Meyer 2008). Violent suppression may have set up similar chain migration among
devout Catholics, especially from Mexico’s west central Catholic heartland where
the violence was most intense (e.g., Jalisco, Michoacan and Guanajuanto). In fact,
the map “State of Origin of Migratory Agricultural Workers Entering U.S. 1942-
1968” suggests migration was highest from the same regions where the Cristero
Rebellion was most violent (Perry-Casta~neda Library 2017). In this case, early
immigrants would be disproportionately devout Catholics, and later Mexican
immigrants would move to communities where the Catholic Church was both
well established and symbolically important, making conversion to Protestantism
more difficult.
Finally, Latin American immigrants that claim European ancestry also tend to
be from disproportionately privileged backgrounds, as were the first wave of immi-
grants from Cuba (Eckstein and Barberia 2002). Early Cuban migrants tended to
be from elite backgrounds. This high status may have made it easier for them to
integrate into to the dominant Protestant culture in the U.S. Later Cuban
migrants were disproportionately from impoverished backgrounds (Portes and
Stepick 1985; Pew Research 2006; Wasem 2009)—which may have hampered
personal interaction between early and later waves, and weakened the influence of
early waves on later waves. The importance of the history and religious context of
U.S. Latino’s country of origin leads us to hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: Compared to respondents with Mexican backgrounds, respondents who have
Central American, and Puerto Rican backgrounds will be more likely to be converts to
Protestantism as opposed to being lifelong Catholics.
Hypothesis 5: Compared to respondents with Mexican backgrounds, respondents who have
European or Cuban backgrounds will be more likely to either be converts to Protestantism or to be
lifelong Protestants as opposed to being lifelong Catholics.
Assimilation Theories for Religions Conversion
Finally, others suggest assimilation theories may explain why some Latinos con-
vert to Protestantism (Hunt 1999; Perl et al. 2006; Navarro-Rivera et al. 2010). As
immigrants live longer in the U.S., they pick up practices and mores from U.S. cul-
ture through both assimilation and acculturation practices (Zhou 1997). Latinos who
are more assimilated into U.S. culture or want to identify more strongly with the
dominant community may be more likely to convert to Protestantism (Telles and
Ortiz 2008; Navarro-Rivera et al. 2010). Alternatively, Latinos who are more assimi-
lated may feel fewer barriers to Protestantism, whether or not they view conversion as
helping them assimilate (after all, U.S. culture is also diverse and many elites are not
Protestant or even religious). Common proxies for measuring assimilation among
Latinos include Spanish language use (i.e., linguistic status) and generational status
(Perl et al. 2006; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Mulder et al. 2017).
Language is a proxy for assimilation because language is a prism through which
cultural identity is formed, lived, and experienced and it can indicate psychologi-
cal closeness to a culture. A loss of Spanish language skills could be a sign of cul-
tural assimilation (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Individuals who speak primarily
Spanish may be more embedded within Latino networks and contexts including
the Catholic Church, and may feel greater affinity with Latino folkways and mores
(Pew Research Center 2014c; Calvillo and Bailey 2015). Moreover, gaining English
fluency opens people to friendships and information sources outside the Latino com-
munity. Thus, both English gain and Spanish loss may make Latinos more open to
conversion. Although Spanish-based ministries and church services focused on
Latinos are spreading (Mulder et al. 2017), English dominant Latinos may still have
more interaction with Protestants and feel more comfortable attending Protestant
churches compared to dominate Spanish speakers. Consistent with this argument,
Latinos interviewed in Spanish are significantly more likely to be Catholic than those
interviewed in English (Hunt 1999; Perl et al. 2006). A similar study also using the
2006 Pew Hispanic Survey found that Latinos Catholics are more likely to use
Spanish at home compared to Latino Protestants due to the linkages that Catholicism
maintains with sending communities in Latin America (Calvillo and Bailey 2015).
Generation status might also be associated with assimilation. However, when
linguistic status is controlled, there is typically no net association between genera-
tional status and religious identification among U.S. Latinos (Perl et al. 2006).
This leads to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Compared to respondents who are Spanish dominant respondents who are English
dominant, and to a lesser extent those who are bilingual, will be more likely to be converts to
Protestantism as opposed to being lifelong Catholics.
Hypothesis 7: Generational status will not affect the likelihood of converting to Protestantism
once other factors are controlled.
Other Predictors of Religious Switching
We also control known predictors of religious switching in the general popula-
tion. First, some researchers explain religious change as status-seeking or status
expression (Sherkat and Wilson 1995; Verter 2003). According to this view, indi-
viduals who aspire to a higher status join religious groups to symbolically signify a
high status, to cultivate social ties, or to gain resources that facilitate upward
mobility. Some argue that among Latinos Protestantism could signal increased
social mobility (Navarro-Rivera et al. 2010; Mulder et al. 2017). Analyses of the
General Social Survey and topline reports of the Pew data suggests that Latino
converts tend to have higher education, income, and occupational prestige (Hunt
1999; Pew Research 2009). However, in the general population, there is an inverse
relationship with level of education and conservative Protestant affiliation—at
least for women (Hackett and Lindsay 2008; Fitzgerald and Glass 2012). We
hypothesize that those with more education and high levels of yearly income will
be more likely to convert then be lifelong Catholics.
Family life cycles also influence religious change, particularly marriage and having
kids (Stolzenberg et al. 1995). Evangelical Protestantism may also offer Latina women
a supportive and empowering environment. This seems to influence conversion to
Protestantism in Latin American (e.g., Hallum 2003; Brusco 2010), and fits with
work on women in U.S. evangelical communities (e.g., Woodberry and Smith 1998;
Bartkowski 2004). We also theorize that those who are divorced will be more likely
to become Protestant, because of the Catholic Church’s stronger prohibition against
divorce and remarriage. Urban areas create opportunities for more religious choice;
greater population density facilitates the creation of ethnically focused congregations
and greater freedom about which co-ethnics to associate with. Together this may give
urban areas less social constraints for conversion compared to rural areas.
Finally, we recognize that both interviews with Latino converts and ethno-
graphic work in Latino churches suggests that non-instrumental considerations are
important for conversion (Mulder et al. 2017). However, non-instrumental causes
are more difficult to measure on surveys (including the survey we use). Moreover,
instrumental and non-instrumental considerations are not incompatible—most
religious actions are probably influenced by both.
METHOD
To study U.S. Latino conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism, we analyze
data from a nationwide probability sample of 4,016 Latinos 18 or older living in the
U.S. These data come from the Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of
American Religion Survey: a CATI-assisted random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone survey
conducted from August 10 to October 4, 2006 by the Pew Hispanic Center and the
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Interviews were conducted in English or
Spanish, according to the preference of the respondent. The survey response rate is
23.4%, refusal rate is 10.7%, and non-contact is 66.0%. The Pew data overcome two
major problems with previous studies of Latino religion by (1) including non-English
speakers and (2) asking about Latino identity directly, rather than asking the respon-
dent to provide information on possible Latino ancestry (Perl et al. 2006). These data
provide a large sample of English and non-English speaking Latinos from diverse
national-origin groups, and has many items gauging Latino identity salience, residen-
tial context, and socio-demographic characteristics. We are interested in what pre-
dicts either being or becoming Protestant—as opposed to remaining Catholic.
Therefore, we exclude the following respondents: (1) non-religious people (n¼ 493),
(2) people who converted from Protestantism to Catholicism (n ¼ 22), (3) people
who converted from Protestantism to another faith (n ¼ 19), and (4) lifelong mem-
bers of a faith other than Catholicism or Protestantism (n¼ 164).
Dependent Variables
We derived our dependent variables from the following questions, which were
asked of all respondents: (1) “What is your religion – Catholic, Evangelical or
Protestant Christian, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, or Orthodox
Church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox church?”, (2) “Have you always
been [that religion] or did you convert from another faith or religion you practiced
in the past?”, and if respondent said they were a convert they were asked,
(3) “What were you before – Catholic, Evangelical or Protestant Christian,
Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, or Orthodox Church such as the
Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?” We used the responses to these questions to
classify respondents into one of the following three categories:
Converts: Respondents who identified as Protestant based on the Steensland et al.
(2000) classification scheme at the time of interview, and who reported having
converted from Catholicism, were identified as “converts” (n ¼ 421, 14.2% of the
sample). The vast majority became evangelical (87.4%), rather than mainline
Protestant (12.6%).
Lifelong Protestants: Respondents who reported both being Protestant and never
switching religions were identified as “lifelong Protestants” (n¼ 583, 19.6%).
Lifelong Catholics: Those who reported both being Catholic and never switching
religions were identified as “lifelong Catholics” (n¼ 1,960, 66.1%).
Key Covariates
Our multivariate models examine predictors of either being or becoming
Protestant, as opposed to remaining Catholic. For most variables, we use a series of
dummy variables—we list the reference category last. Latino concentration: The
percentage of Latinos residing in the same telephone exchange as the respondent
(less than 14%, 15–29%, 30–49%, 50–74% versus 75–100%)1; region of residence
(Northcentral, West, West South Central,2 East South Central3/South Atlantic4
versus Northeast); location type (urban, suburban versus rural); national origin
group (Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Central American [including
Salvadoran], South American, European, Other versus Mexican); linguistic status
(indicated by respondents and not by language chosen at interview) (English dom-
inant, bilingual versus Spanish dominant), and generation status (first generation,
second generation versus third generation or more).
Controls
To avoid confounding the association between religious affiliation and our
variables of interest, we control for gender (1 ¼ female, 0 ¼ male); age (continu-
ous); marital status (divorced, separated, widow, married versus never married),
educational attainment (less than high school degree, high school diploma only,
1The Pew constructed these variables by stratifying the sample according to the density of
the Latino population in a respondent’s residential area, as determined by telephone area code
and exchange (the first three digits of the telephone number). According to the Pew “the sam-
ples were constructed to reflect the distribution of the Latino population across five strata of
density,” (Pew Research Center 2009: 54).
2Which includes the states of AK, LA, OK, and TX.
3Which includes the states of AL, KY, MS, and TN.
4Which includes the states of FL, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, and DE.
some college or vocational training, graduate or professional degree versus four-
year college degree or more); and household income before taxes (continuous).
Analytic Strategy
Our data analysis begins by presenting descriptive statistics on key variables of
interest by adherence category (lifelong Catholic, lifelong Protestant, and con-
verts)—this information is displayed in table 1. Next, our main hypotheses are
tested using multinomial logistic regression models, which estimate the net effects
of Latino concentration, region of residence, national origin group, linguistic ori-
entation, and generational status (hypothesis 1–hypothesis 4, respectively)–along
with socio-demographic covariates—on the likelihood of (1) being a lifelong
Protestant and (2) switching from Catholicism to Protestantism, relative to being
a lifelong Catholic. The results, displayed in table 2, are expressed as relative risk
ratios. Given the strong prevalence of Catholicism among the Latino community,
these analyses treat lifelong Catholics as the reference category, with which life-
long Protestants and converts are compared. The baseline model features the
effects of demographic variables and income on the likelihood of being a convert.
We used multiple imputation in Stata/SE 14.2 to deal with missing cases.
All variables with missing cases in the analyses were imputed except for the
dependent variable, however the dependent variable was included in the im-
putation equation. Five imputations were used and pooled for final analyses.5
This procedure yielded an effective sample of 2,964, composed of lifelong
Catholics, lifelong Protestants, and converts to Protestantism. We weighted all
analyses using the Pew Forums’ variable “NEWWEIGHT” which produces
national representative samples of Latinos and corrects for oversampling of
non-Mexican origin respondents (Pew Research Center 2009). Our discussion
of results focuses exclusively on those findings that bear directly on study
hypotheses.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics among key variables are presented in table 1. We
describe the weighted results for the total sample. Most respondents live in tele-
phone exchanges with a moderate to high proportion of Latino co-residents
(74%). Most of the respondents resided in the western U.S. (41%), while 36%
resided in the southern U.S., and 14% resided in the Northeast. Most have
Mexican ancestry (66%), followed by Central Americans (9%), and Puerto
Ricans (8%). No other national group has more than 8%. About half of respon-
dents are Spanish-dominant (51%), while 29% are bilingual, and 20% are
5The issue of perfect prediction arose during multiple imputation because our models
have a large number of categorical variables, we therefore used the “augment” option as
described in White et al. (2010).
 TABLE 1. Means/Proportions on All Variables Used in Analyses
Variables Converts Lifelong Caths. Lifelong Prots. Total
Wt. No Wt. Wt. NoWt. Wt. NoWt. Wt. No Wt.
% Latino Concentration
Less than 14% 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
15–29% 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.15
30–49% 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.31
50–74% 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.31
75–100% (ref.) 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.16
Census Region
North Central 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.05
West 0.43 0.29 0.42 0.25 0.38 0.26 0.41 0.26
West South Central 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.24 0.13 0.21 0.12
East South
Cent./South
Atlantic
0.15 0.23 0.15 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.25
Northeast (ref). 0.14 0.30 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.32 0.14 0.33
National Origin Status
Puerto Rican 0.19 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.11
European 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Cuban 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.10
Dominican 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.09
Central American 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.14
South American 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.14
Others 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Mexican (ref.) 0.54 0.37 0.70 0.42 0.52 0.33 0.66 0.40
Assimilation Measures
English dominant 0.34 0.21 0.16 0.10 0.34 0.19 0.20 0.13
Bilingual 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.27
Spanish
dominant (ref.)
0.36 0.49 0.55 0.64 0.34 0.51 0.51 0.59
First generation 0.54 0.71 0.68 0.82 0.46 0.69 0.64 0.78
Second generation 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.10
Third
generation (ref.)
0.32 0.18 0.19 0.09 0.37 0.19 0.22 0.12
Gender
Female 0.60 0.63 0.48 0.57 0.50 0.58 0.50 0.58
Male (ref.) 0.40 0.37 0.52 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.42
Age 2.68 2.88 2.39 2.66 2.34 2.58 2.41 2.67
Continued
English-dominant. About 64% are first generation immigrants, 13% are second
generation, and 22% are third generation Latinos. In terms of controls, our
weighted sample is split evenly between female (50%) and male (50%). Over half
of our sample is married (56%). Most live in urban areas (76%). In terms of socio-
economic characteristics, most make about 30k in yearly income and the majority
of the sample has less than a high school degree (42%) while a quarter of the sam-
ple has a high school degree.
In table 2 we test our main hypotheses using multinomial logistic regressions
which estimate the likelihood of (1) being a lifelong Protestant and (2) switching
from Catholicism to Protestantism, relative to being a lifelong Catholic. We pre-
sent the results as relative risk ratios with lifelong Catholics as the reference cate-
gory. We only discuss results relevant to our hypotheses. In models 1 and 2
(columns 1–4) we enter demographic controls. In model 3 we enter variables
related to the SI thesis applied to Latino conversion. In model 4 we test the
national origin hypothesis. Finally, in model 5 we test assimilation theories. Many
 TABLE 1. Continued
Variables Converts Lifelong Caths. Lifelong Prots. Total
Wt. No Wt. Wt. No Wt. Wt. No Wt. Wt. No Wt.
Marital Status
Divorced 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
Separated 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07
Widowed 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07
Married 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.54 0.56 0.56
Never
married (ref.)
0.20 0.15 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.22
Location type
Urban 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.77
Suburban 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.17
Rural (ref.) 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06
Income 30.8k 28.8k 26.8k 27.1k 32.9k 29.6k 27.9k 27.8k
Education
Less than
high school
0.35 0.35 0.45 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.42 0.37
High school 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25
GED 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Vocational 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05
Some college 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.13
Professional/
graduate
0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
College
graduate (ref.)
0.08 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.13
Observations 421 (14.20%) 1,960 (66.13%) 583 (19.67%) 2,964 (100%)
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of the coefficients change when we control for national origin; a few change when
we control for assimilation theory. For clarity sake, we consistently use the relative
risk ratios from model 5 in our discussion of results.6
Contra hypothesis 1 conversions do not vary consistently with the percent
Latino in each region as would be predicted by our extension of the SI thesis.
According to the theory we would expect Latinos residing in areas with lower con-
centration of co-ethics to be more likely to convert to Protestantism because the
risk of social sanctioning and loss of community with other Latino Catholics.
Instead we find, in the full model, Latinos residing in areas with a moderate pro-
portion of co-ethnics, i.e., in areas with telephone exchanges with 15–29% or 30–
49% Latinos, had 47% less risk of conversion (RRR ¼ 0.53, p  0.05 and RRR ¼
0.53, p  0.05, respectively), compared to Latinos residing in areas of heavy
Latino concentration (the reference group). The relationship between conversion
and percent Latino in each respondent’s telephone exchange is curvilinear.
Perhaps Latino Catholic social constraints are greater in areas with moderate con-
centrations of Latinos, but this is not what we expected based on religiosity among
Mormons and African-Americans as described by the SI thesis.
Moving to census regions (hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3), we hypothesized
that if social sanctions and benefits operate at the level of the broad “racial/ethnic”
category “Latino,” we would expect fewer conversions in regions with large, well-
established Latino communities such as the West and West South Central (which
includes Texas) and more conversions in regions with small and recent Latino
communities such as the East South Central/South Atlantic where Latinos are less
in number and where Protestantism is more strongly established. Results support
hypothesis 3. We find that Latinos residing in the East South Central/South
Atlantic of the U.S. had about one and a half times the risk of being converts to
Protestantism compared to those in the Northeast (RRR ¼ 1.66, p  0.10). In
contrast, results contradict hypothesis 2, residents of the West and West South
Central had almost three times the risk of being converts compared to being lifelong
Catholics (RRR ¼ 2.89, p  0.001 and RRR ¼ 2.82, p  0.01, respectively).
Both the West and West South Central have higher concentrations of Latinos
and the North Central and North East have lower concentrations of Latinos.
In ancillary analyses, we rotated the reference categories and the risk of con-
version is also higher in the West and West South Central regions than in the
East South Central/South Atlantic regions—i.e., the relative risk of being a con-
vert is highest in the area with the largest and most well established Latino com-
munities. Thus, our analysis of region does not support our extension of the SI
thesis.
6Approximately 76% of converts converted while in the United States. Our results were
consistent even when we limited the sample to respondents who converted in the United
States. Additionally, other analysis included foreign born status in the models, but were re-
moved due to insignificance and collinearity with generational status.
A more consistent pattern is that places with more lifelong Protestants are also
places with more converts. If, within each model, we compare the relative risk
ratios for lifelong Protestants and converts, they are almost always in the same
direction (i.e., both higher than 1 or both lower than 1), and almost always
roughly the same magnitude. This suggests that in places Protestants gained an
early foothold, other Latinos are more likely to convert regardless of the social
context. Similarly, places with more Latinos are more likely to have both higher
proportions lifelong Protestants and converts than lifelong Catholics.
In model 4 we add measures related to national origin. Latinos with Puerto
Rican ancestry had almost eight times the risk of being converts to Protestantism
compared to those with Mexican ancestry, while Central Americans had more
than twice the risk (RRR ¼ 7.97, p  0.001; RRR ¼ 2.30, p  0.001, respec-
tively), demonstrating support for hypothesis 4. South Americans had 2.15 times
the risk of lifelong Protestants (RRR ¼ 2.15, p  0.01) but not converts.
Europeans had more than twice the risk of being converts and lifelong Protestants
compared to Mexicans, also demonstrating partial support for hypothesis 5. In con-
trast, Cuban ancestry did not predict conversion which does not support hypothe-
sis 5, however they had three times the risk of being lifelong Protestants (RRR ¼
3.51, p  0.01). This makes sense for Cubans, because the early wave of immi-
grants fleeing the communist revolution in the 1950s and 1960s were often weal-
thy and highly educated elites, whereas following waves were often impoverished,
non-elites (e.g., the Mariel boat people of 1980). The large difference in time and
status may mean new Cuban immigrants do not move in the same social circles as
older Cuban immigrants. It is not an example of chain migration where new immi-
grants often live with and draw on the social networks of earlier immigrants.
The patterns are generally similar among lifelong Protestants. Central
Americans had more than five times the risk of being lifelong Protestants than
Mexican-origin Latinos (RRR ¼ 5.69, p  0.00). This makes sense given the long
history of Protestantism in Central America and the importance of Protestantism
in violent areas where chain migrations are more likely to start. Similarly, Puerto
Ricans had more than four times the risk of being lifelong Protestants than lifelong
Catholics (RRR ¼ 4.67, p  0.001), which matches the long history of Protestant
missions in Puerto Rico and in New York.
Next we test assimilation theory in model 5, by including linguistic status and
generation. We find partial support for hypothesis 6. Latinos who are English dom-
inant had almost three times the risk of being converts (RRR ¼ 2.93, p  0.001)
and 1.83 times the risk of being lifelong Protestants (RRR ¼ 1.83, p  0.05).
Bilingualism is not statistically significant, but the coefficient is in the predicted
direction. We do find support for hypothesis 7; generation status has no effect on
conversion. Respondents who are first generational had 45% less risk of being a
lifelong Protestants compared to third generation respondents, but this is what we
would expect if a context where more Latinos convert from Catholicism to
Protestantism than vice versa.
Last, we turn to our controls. Women are more likely to be converts. Marital
status does not predict conversion nor being lifelong Protestant. As seen in previ-
ous research, both converts and lifelong Protestants have slightly higher incomes
than lifelong Catholics in most models, but this becomes insignificant for converts
in model 5. Both education and urbanity do not appear to influence the likelihood
of conversion.7
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The growth of Latino Protestantism has generated a great deal of discussion
in scholarly, popular, and religious circles. However, surprisingly few studies have
investigated this issue empirically—partially because of the lack of sound data on
the religious backgrounds and affiliations of Latinos in the United States. Our
study addresses this significant gap in the research literature by testing prominent
theories of religious conversion and by developing new theories that are unique to
the Latino experience. First, we tested the semi-involuntary thesis, a framework
that focuses on the potential for social constraints and sanctions to constrain
Latinos’ decisions to choose Protestantism over Catholicism. Next, we presented a
new theory, the national origin hypothesis, that the religious context of Latino
immigrants’ country of origin shapes conversion in the United States. When
violence in areas that were disproportionately Protestant or Catholic spurred chain
migrations, the proportion Protestant or Catholic among the first wave of
immigrants may influence the religious networks later waves of immigrants link to
in the United States. Lastly, we explored how indicators of assimilation (Spanish
language use) predict the likelihood of Latinos converting to Protestantism.
We find little support for our extension of the SI thesis if we apply it to
Latinos as a whole. If the SI thesis works among Latinos like it does among
African-Americans (through a broad racial/ethnic category), we would expect
conversions to be less common among Latinos in areas with high concentrations
of Latino Catholics (hypothesis 1). However, conversion rates are comparable in
the areas with the highest and lowest concentrations of Latinos (as measured by
the percentage of Latinos in the respondent’s telephone exchange). Those living
in moderate levels of Latino concentration are less likely to become Protestant,
but this is not what we predicted, and it only happens after we control for region,
national origin, and demographics. Why might this be so? One explanation may
be that high concentrations of Latinos allow more religious choices without alien-
ation from Latino culture. Consequently, Latinos in these areas may feel greater
7Per reviewer suggestion, we included a final model with interactions terms (Puerto Rican
 first generation, and Central American  first generation). The interaction coefficients for
Puerto Ricans and Central Americans are not statistically significant in the models predicting
conversion to Protestantism—collinearity and small sizes create a large standard error, how-
ever, the pattern of coefficients is consistent with our theory. Please see online appendix.
freedom to make religious decisions based on personal preferences, without regard
for social sanctions. In addition, areas with small Latino populations may lack cul-
tural infrastructure (Odem and Lacy 2009; Vega 2015), including Latino Catholic
parishes, which may also create incentives that drive switching to Protestantism.
We find little evidence for our extension of the SI thesis using regional varia-
tion. Although there are differences between regions, the differences do not follow
the pattern we predicted—i.e., there is no monotonic pattern based on size of the
Latino population, historic length of the Latino community, percent Catholic in
the general population, or church attendance in the general population.8 Both the
West and West South Central have high concentrations of Latinos where social
pressure from co-ethnics might be greater—but in both regions conversion is
higher. Thus, the size and establishment of the Latino community does not seem
to explain regional variation in conversion as it seems to explain African-
American religious practice. The higher rate of conversion outside the Northeast
(once national origin is controlled)9 may be because the Catholic Church has
more churches and institutions in the Northeast and thus is more able to integrate
Latino immigrants in the Northeast than elsewhere. Alternatively, conversion
rates may be higher in places with more conversionary Protestants that actively
reach out to Latinos (e.g., in the South, Midwest and agricultural regions of the
West).
Our proposed extension of the semi-involuntary thesis among U.S. Latinos
does not match the overall pattern of regional variation in conversion. Places with
the most established Latino communities have the most converts and places with
the least established Latino communities are in the middle. The evidence on eth-
nic concentrations also does not match our SI derived predictions.
Thus, perhaps “Latino” is too broad a category and the networks that shape
Latino conversions operate at a much narrower level—such as national origin
groups or sub-national groups. In contrast to the broad SI thesis, we find that na-
tional origin hypothesis strongly predicts the prevalence of both converts and life-
long Protestants. Latinos from national backgrounds that have stronger Protestant
legacies are much more likely to be converts, particularly Puerto Ricans, Central
Americans, and those with European ancestry (showing support for hypothesis 4).
An exception to this pattern are Cubans—Cuba has few Protestants, whereas in
the U.S. Cubans are more likely than Mexican-origin Latinos to be lifelong
Protestants, but not to be converts.
8We do not directly measure church attendance, percent Catholics, etc., in our analyses.
However, for example, church attendance is relatively high in the South and relatively low in
the Northeast and West. But converts are more prevalent in the West and less prevalent in
the Northeast and East South Central/South Atlantic regions.
9Our results indicate Latinos with Mexican origin are less likely to convert. To the extent
that people of Mexican ancestry are disproportionately in the West and West South Central
regions, this may explain why religion variation only becomes statistically significant after we
control for respondents’ national origin.
Central Americans may be more likely to convert because many come from in-
digenous communities (e.g., Mayans). In general, conversion to Protestantism has
traditionally been greater among minority indigenous communities who have his-
torically been discriminated against by the dominant Spanish speaking community
(Green 2013) and where Protestant missionaries have emphasized translation into
the vernacular (Woodberry 2012). Additionally, revolutionary wars (which have
often centered in areas with large indigenous communities) forced most Catholic
clergy to flee, opening room for lay-lead Pentecostal movements and set off chain
migrations to the U.S. among people who were already Protestant or had favorable
opinions of Protestants (Garrard-Burnett 1998; Chinchilla and Hamilton 2004).
When we look at table 2, we see that all national origin groups are more likely
to be lifelong Protestants when compared to Mexicans, but the coefficients are
largest in the groups with historical deep legacies of Protestantism. The risk of be-
ing a convert is also typically greater among national origin groups with a deep leg-
acy of Protestantism. Generally, if the coefficient for lifelong Protestants is
significant, so is the coefficient for converts. Even when only one is significant,
both are usually in the same direction and comparable in size. This makes sense if
Catholic Latinos are mainly converted by Protestant Latinos in their immediate
networks (which ethnographic evidence suggests is true) (Mulder et al. 2017).
Thus, whichever groups ended up with more Protestants in them (for whatever
reason), will tend to have more converts in the future.
While this is a form of acculturation, it is not assimilation to the dominant
White Anglo-Sax Protestant culture; the probability of converting to
Protestantism is shaped by the particular subgroup of Latinos one is most con-
nected to. Early Protestant immigrants facilitate conversions among later Catholic
immigrants who either have or gain Protestants friends through immigration. How
might these conversions be facilitated? In the case of the Catholic Church, Levitt
(2004) and Mooney (2009) find that transnational religious life can have institu-
tional aspects and that allowed seamless transitions from sending countries into
well-established networks in receiving counties. Recent ethnographic evidence in
Oregon, North Carolina, and Texas (Berho et al. 2017; Mulder et al. 2017) shows
that similar transnational organization in some Latino Protestant congregations
may jumpstart the processes of conversion. These Latino Protestant congregations
have deep ties to home communities in Latin American. Over time, these U.S.
churches become important sources of social support for incoming immigrants
including Catholic immigrants. Additionally, there is probably less resistance by
these Catholic immigrants to go to a Protestant church becomes of the promi-
nence of Protestantism in their home countries. It is in these spaces and via trans-
national religion that Catholics are exposed to other immigrants like themselves
who just happen to be Protestant and convert.
Overall, findings from the national origin hypothesis implies that theories of
conversion among Latinos need to pay attention to the cross-national networks
immigrants have, the attitudes and relationships they bring with them, and the
particular groups that began chain migrations from specific communities (e.g.,
were they devout Protestants or devout Catholics?). The relative resistance of
Mexican-origin Latinos to Protestant conversion may have more to do with the
Mexican government’s violent suppression of the Catholic Church in the first half
of the 20th century (and the chain migrations that ensued), than with either their
local context in the U.S. or a “greater resistance” of Mexican-origin Latinos to
assimilation in the dominant U.S. culture. This demonstrates the need for large
data collections to not treat Latinos in the U.S. as a homogenous group, but to
aim to ensure adequate representation of the ethnic variation in this population.
Finally we found some support for assimilation theories (hypothesis 6)—
English preference predicts being a Latino convert, but we propose some caution.
First, we do not know the causal order, therefore we cannot know if converts are
more likely to grow in their English fluency, or if those who have more English
ability are more likely to convert. The evidence that Latino Protestants are more
English dominant is clear (Hunt 1999; Navarro-Rivera et al. 2010; Calvillo and
Bailey 2015), but we do not know if the English/convert association is because
converts desire to assimilate into the dominate culture, or because English domi-
nance changes Latinos networks and opens them up to conversion attempts by
non-Latinos, or because of some other reason. Moreover, recent cross-national
ethnographic evidence of Latino Protestant congregations indicates that they are
diverse in their language use: some communities hold services that are bilingual or
multilingual, while others only speak Spanish or English (Mulder et al. 2017).
There is also evidence that some Latino Protestant congregations play important
roles in maintaining ethnic ties through Spanish language use (Berho et al. 2017;
Mulder et al. 2017). Our study indicates that English-dominant Latinos are more
likely to be converts, but ethnographic or fine-grained longitudinal data are neces-
sary to understand the relationship between and motivations for conversion and
language change.
Like all research, our work has limitations. First, our data are cross-sectional,
so we cannot determine whether English-language use, and residential location
proceed or follow conversion; indeed, some bi-directional causation is likely.
Future work using longitudinal data would help. A second limitation is the small
sample sizes for some national origin groups (e.g., Cubans). This article demon-
strates the need for large data collections that ensure adequate representation of
the ethnic diversity in this population. Even the term “Latino Protestant” needs
to be interrogated and re-theorized to better understand the complex experi-
ences of Latino Protestants and their churches (Martı 2015; Mulder et al. 2017).
It is important to note that the Pew data used in this study oversamples immi-
grants (62%, weighted) compared to government estimates (49.8% in 2012,
55% in 2007) (Pew Research Center 2014b) which may affect generalizability.
However, governmental estimates of the Latino immigrant population under-
counts foreign born-Latinos (Jensen et al. 2015), particularly undocumented
immigrants (Massey and Capoferro 2004).Third, our interpretation of the tele-
phone exchange measure assumes that most communities with high concentra-
tions of Latinos are majority Catholic communities. However, some
communities with high concentrations of Latinos could be majority Protestant
and weaken the association predicted by the SI thesis. Unfortunately, untan-
gling this puzzle is not feasible with current data. Fourth, our statistical analysis
is skewed towards reasons for conversion that are easy to measure with existing
survey questions—which tend to focus on demographics and instrumental rea-
sons for conversion. Yet, some scholars argue that demographic and instrumen-
tal theories oversimplify the decision-making process of converts and do not
give the reasons converts give for their own conversion sufficient weight (e.g.,
Roberts 2012). Certainly, converts are often willing to accept large costs (some-
times even violent persecution) to convert and in Latin America neither nega-
tive attitudes towards Evangelicals nor violence has prevented conversions
(Garrard-Burnett 1998; Smilde 2007; Brusco 2010). Other survey research has
found that mere material deprivation does not cause conversion, but “spiritual
deprivation” (i.e., the need to answer existential questions such as the meaning
of life) are important as well (Stark and Smith 2010).
Despite these limitations, this study extends the small but growing litera-
ture on Latino Protestants. We found mixed support for assimilation theory,
limited support for our extension of the SI thesis (at least if applied to Latinos
as a whole), but substantial support that contextual factors matter when mea-
sured at a level more relevant to the everyday lives of Latinos (e.g., national or-
igin groups). Groups that had more Protestants in the early waves of migration
tend to have more converts to Protestantism later on. Our thesis that migra-
tion chains and early immigrant religious institutions shape later conversions
generalizes to other immigrant groups as well: for example, Vietnamese and
Koreans. Early immigrants in both communities were disproportionately
Christian: either because of persecution by communists (Vietnamese and
North Koreans), or via links with Protestant missionaries and churches
(Koreans and Southeast Asian ethnic minorities) (Chai 1998). Later waves of
immigrants linked to the early ethnic organizations first-wave immigrants set
up (i.e., ethnic churches) and disproportionately converted. Now the majority
of Korean-Americans are Protestant (61%), even though only 19% of Koreans
are (Connor 2014).
For too long, researchers have neglected empirical research about religious
change among U.S. Latinos. Yet expanding Protestantism could alter Latino soli-
darity, family structure, social life, and politics, and change the broader U.S. reli-
gious landscape. Future studies should engage the issues raised in this article in
order to understand the dynamics and complexities of religious life in the increas-
ingly heterogeneous U.S. Latino population.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A supplementary section is located with the electronic version of this article
at Sociology of Religion online (http://www.socrel.oxfordjournals.org).
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